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Bruin S. Richardson, III"
The Annual Survey last addressed Virginia Workers' Compen-
sation law in 1992.' The Virginia Workers' Compensation Com-
mission [the Commission] decides almost 1500 decisions a year
and, on average, 300 of these are appealed to the Court of
Appeals of Virginia.2 Consequently, this article discusses only
the most significant developments in workers' compensation
between January 1993 and June 1995. In doing so, the article
attempts to highlight areas of controversy and inconsistency.
Part I discusses occupational disease claims, Part II discusses
injury by accident claims, and Part Ill discusses coverage of the
Virginia Workers' Compensation Act [the Act].3 Part IV discuss-
es defenses, benefits, and selective employment, Part V discuss-
es procedure, and Part VI discusses legislation.
I. OccuPATIoNAL DISEASE CLAIMS
Although occupational disease claims constitute only three
percent of all claims filed with the Commission,4 the most hotly
debated topic since November 5, 1993 has been the definition of
* Associate, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; BA., 1988, University
of Virginia; J.D., 1991, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
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** Associate, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; BA., 1986, Washington
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1. Mary G. Commander, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Workers' Compensation,
26 U. RICH. L. REv. 903 (1992).
2. VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMIUSSION, 1994 YEAR-END STATISTICAL
REPORT (1995).
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -1310 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
4. VERGIIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 5.
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disease. On that day, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued its
decision in Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks.'
In Merillat, the employer appealed rulings by the Commis-
sion6 and the Court of Appeals of Virginia7 that the claimant's
rotator cuff tear was a compensable occupational disease under
Virginia Code section 65.1-46 (now section 65.2-400).' The
Merillat court held that, for a condition to be an occupational
disease covered by the Act, the claimant's condition must first
and foremost be a "disease."9 The court found that the medical
evidence in the record classified the claimant's rotator cuff tear
as an injury, not a disease.' ° Accordingly, because the injury
occurred gradually, as the result of repetitive trauma, the court
held that the claimant's injury was not compensable under the
Act."
Merillat created an uproar. The immediate question became
whether repetitive trauma conditions such as carpal tunnel
syndrome, epicondylitis (tennis elbow) and tenosynovitis (trigger
thumb) were compensable occupational "diseases" or non-com-
pensable repetitive trauma "injuries," like the rotator cuff
tear.'2 Unfortunately, Merillat provided little guidance because
the court failed to define the term "disease."
The court of appeals, however, quickly provided their answer
to the question. In Piedmont Manufacturing Co. v. East," the
court considered whether de Quervain's tenosynovitis is a dis-
ease. Unlike the supreme court in Merillat, the Piedmont court
offered a definition of disease: "any deviation from or interrup-
5. 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993).
6. Parks v. Merillat Indus., 70 O.I.C. 158 (1991), affd, 15 Va. App. 44, 421
S.E.2d 867 (1992), rev'd, 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993).
7. Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks, 15 Va. App. 44, 421 S.E.2d 867 (1992),
rev'd, 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993).
8. Merillat, 246 Va. at 430-31, 436 S.E.2d at 600. Effective October 1, 1991,
Title 65.1 was recodified as Title 65.2. Id. The Deputy Comuissioner's decision was
under the prior codification. Id.
9. Id. at 432, 436 S.E.2d at 601.
10. Id. at 433, 436 S.E.2d at 602.
11. Id. at 433-34, 436 S.E.2d at 602.
12. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jennings, No. 2459-93-3, 1994 Va. App. WL
594170 (Nov. 1, 1994). This discussion assumes that the evidence establishes that the
condition is work-related.
13. 17 Va. App. 499, 438 S.E.2d 769 (1993).
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tion of the normal structure or function of any part, organ, or
system (or combination thereof) of the body that is manifested
by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs and whose etiolo-
gy, pathology, and prognosis may be known or unknown." 4
Using this standard as a guideline, the court found that the
evidence established that de Quervain's tenosynovitis is a dis-
ease and, in this case, concluded that the condition was com-
pensable as an occupational disease.
Relying on the definition in Piedmont, the Commission and
the court of appeals have concluded that varied conditions such
as tendinitis'6 and coronary artery spasm " are diseases. Nev-
ertheless, the debate over repetitive trauma conditions under
the Act seems far from over. The 1995 General Assembly
passed a bill which would have created a presumption that
carpal tunnel syndrome and hearing loss were diseases.'8 Gov-
ernor Allen, however, vetoed the bill.' Further, for more than
a year after Merillat, Commissioner Tarr, the chairman of the
Commission, consistently dissented from opinions relying on
Piedmont's broad definition of disease." Resolving these issues
14. Id. at 503, 438 S.E.2d at 772 (quoting SLOANE-DORLAND ANN. MEDICAL-LEGAL
DICTIONARY 209 (1987)). While the court of appeals was laudably attempting to pro-
vide further guidance, many practitioners would argue that the definition the court
cited is so broad that it provides little guidance other than an expectation that the
court of appeals could conclude that almost anything is a "disease." It could even be
argued that the definition adopted by the Piedmont court is so broad as to effectively
nullify the Merillat decision.
15. Id. at 504, 507, 438 S.E.2d at 772, 774.
16. Ferguson v. Harrington Corp., V.W.C. File No. 166-73-39 (Dec. 30, 1994).
17. Commonwealth, Dep't of State Police v. Haga, 18 Va. App. 162, 442 S.E.2d
424 (1994).
18. H.B. 2067, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1995). The Commission traditionally
considered hearing loss an occupational disease. Collier v. Tara K. Coal, V.W.C. File
No. 170-01-56 (June 6, 1995). After Merillat, however, the Commission requires that
the evidence in the record support that alleged hearing loss is a disease. Napier v.
English Constr. Co., V.W.C. File No. 164-06-19 (July 25, 1994). Claimants, however,
can rely on the broad definition of disease in Piedmont to make this showing. See
Collier, V.W.C. File No. 170-01-56.
19. Important Bills in the General Assembly, 9 V.L.W. 1197 (1995). Regardless, a
claimant can satisfy Merillat by offering the opinion of a doctor that carpal tunnel
syndrome is a disease under the definition announced in Piedmont.
20. See, e.g., Bradfield v. Craig Mfg. Co., V.W.C. File No. 168-27-90 (Dec. 30,
1994) (Tarr, dissenting) (arguing that this broad definition conflicts with Supreme
Court of Virginia decisions in Merillat and TAD Technical Servs. Corp. v. Fletcher,
438 S.E.2d 768 (Va. App. Ct. 1993)); Jennings v. Volvo, V.W.C. File No. 163-47-06
(Aug. 15, 1994) (Tarr, Comm'r, dissenting); Quinting v. Burger King, V.W.C. File No.
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may require the Supreme Court of Virginia to address repeti-
tive trauma conditions once again.
II. INJURY BY ACCIDENT
An overwhelming majority of claims filed with the Commis-
sion allege an injury by accident. It is well settled that to re-
cover under the Act for a work related injury, the claimant
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, three elements:
(1) an injury by accident; (2) arising out of employment; and (3)
in the course of employment.2
A. Injury by Accident
To establish an injury by accident, the claimant must prove:
(1) an identifiable incident; (2) that occurs at some reasonably
definite time; (3) an obvious sudden mechanical or structural
change in the body; and (4) a causal connection between the
incident and the bodily changes.22 The test is easy to apply
when an employee cuts a finger or sustains some other immedi-
ate trauma. The more difficult cases arise when the trauma
does not immediately appear after the incident pointed to as
the cause.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has made it clear in its re-
cent decisions in Merillat, Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,' and Lichtman v. Knouf,' that gradually occurring inju-
ries are not compensable under the Act.
In Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance Co., the claimant sued
her former employer and supervisor for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The employer argued that the exclusivity
161-90-09 (Apr. 29, 1994) (Tarr, Comm'r, dissenting). But see Collier, V.W.C. File No.
170-01-56 (Tarr, Comm'r, concurring) (acknowledging that Piedmont is binding pre-
cedent on the commission).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (defining "injury"); see also, Mar-
keting Profiles, Inc. v. Hill, 17 Va. App. 431, 436, 437 S.E.2d 727, 730 (1993).
22. Teasley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 14 Va. App. 45, 48, 415 S.E.2d 596, 597-
98 (1992) (citing Chesterfield County Fire Dep't v. Dunn, 9 Va. App. 475, 476, 389
S.E.2d 180, 181 (1990)).
23. 247 Va. 150, 439 S.E.2d 394 (1994).
24. 248 Va. 138, 445 S.E.2d 114 (1994).
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provision of the workers' compensation act barred the lawsuit
because emotional distress qualified as an injury by accident.25
The supreme court held that the claimant's emotional distress
gradually occurred and hence did not meet the definition of
injury by accident.26
This holding implicitly overruled the court's earlier decision
in Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.2 In Haddon, the
plaintiff sued her former employer for harassment and gender
discrimination. Ignoring the fact that the harassment that
caused the plaintiffs injuries occurred over a period of months,
the court found the injuries constituted injuries by accident
under the Act.2 ' Therefore, the Act was the exclusive remedy
for the plaintiffs claims.29
If Middlekauff left any question as to the viability of
Haddon, the court's decision in Lichtman v. Knouf0 ended the
controversy. In a five to two decision, the court overruled
Haddon "to the extent that it placed gradually incurred injuries
within the definition of 'injury by accident.'"' As in Haddon
and Middlekauff, the plaintiff sued her former employer for
harassment. The employer argued that the exclusivity provision
of the Act barred the plaintiffs tort claim. 2 Because the ha-
rassment lasted approximately one year, the court found the
injuries occurred gradually and fell outside the Act's definition
of injury by accident. 3 Consequently, the Act did not bar the
plaintiffs lawsuit.'
25. Middlekauff, 247 Va. at 152, 439 S.E.2d at 395-96. Generally, in Virginia, the
Act provides the exclusive remedy for occupational injuries by accident or occupational
diseases. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-307 (Repl. Vol. 1995). As such, employees generally
may not maintain a tort action against their employer when their injury is covered
by the Act.
26. Middlekauff, 247 Va. at 153, 439 S.E.2d at 396.
27. 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990), overruled by Lichtman v. Knouf, 248 Va.
138, 445 S.E.2d 114 (1994). Indeed, a plurality in Middlekauff voted to overrule
Haddon explicitly. Middlekauff, 247 Va. at 150, 439 S.E.2d at 394.
28. Haddon, 239 Va. at 399, 389 S.E.2d at 714.
29. Id. at 400, 389 S.E.2d at 714.
30. 248 Va. 138, 445 S.E.2d 114 (1994).
31. Id. at 140, 445 S.E.2d at 115.
32. Id. at 139, 445 S.E.2d at 115.
33. Id. at 140, 445 S.E.2d at 115.
34. Id.
1995] 1203
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Although the supreme court has made its position clear, the
Commission and the courts have struggled to define the param-
eters of gradually occurring injuries. In its 1989 decision in
Morris v. Morris,"5 the supreme court rejected the position
adopted by the Commission and the court of appeals that inju-
ries resulting from work-related stress lasting less than three
hours were compensable.36 Nevertheless, shortly after Morris,
in Richard E. Brown, Inc. v. Caporaletti" the court of appeals
held that an injury sustained while the claimant bent over a
furnace for four or five minutes was compensable.38
Recently, in Imperial Trash Service v. Dotson,9 the court of
appeals found that an employee's death resulting from several
hours of exertion was compensable. After collecting recyclable
materials from over 700 houses in eighty-six degree heat, the
employee suffered a heatstroke." Seventeen days later, the
employee died of a heart attack attributed to the heatstroke.4'
The court of appeals held that the claimant's heatstroke consti-
tuted a "sudden change in the body" sufficient to establish an
injury by accident.4
Six months earlier, however, in Wilhelm v. Rockydale Quar-
ries,' the court of appeals denied compensation for a
claimant's heart attack which resulted from shoveling for fifteen
minutes. Relying on Morris, the court held that the heart at-
tack did not result from an "identifiable incident" or "sudden
precipitating event" since it could have been caused by "several
hours of physical exertion over the course of the day."
The holding in Imperial Trash seemingly contravenes Morris
and is irreconcilable with a decision only six months earlier.
This is a stark example of the conflict between some the deci-
sions from the court of appeals in this area, and it clearly dem-
35. 238 Va. 578, 385 S.E.2d 858 (1989).
36. Id. at 588, 385 S.E.2d at 864-65.
37. 12 Va. App. 242, 402 S.E.2d 709 (1991).
38. Id. at 245, 402 S.E.2d at 711.
39. 18 Va. App. 600, 445 S.E.2d 716 (1994).
40. Id. at 602, 445 S.E.2d at 717.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 605-06, 445 S.E.2d at 719.
43. No. 1306-93-3, 1993 Va. App. LEXIS 571 (Nov. 30, 1993).
44. Id. (quoting Morris v. Morris, 228 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 858, 865 (1989)).
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onstrates the current uncertainty of the parameters of what
constitutes a gradually occurring injury.'
B. Arising out of Employment
An injury arises out of the employment when it is apparent
to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstanc-
es, that a causal connection exists between the conditions under
which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
injury, and that the employment involves a special degree of
risk to which the general public would not be exposed.46
1. The Actual Risk Test
Virginia recognizes the "actual risk" test to establish that an
injury arose out of the employment.4' "[T]he 'actual risk'
test ... requires that the employment subject the employee to
the particular danger that brought about his or her injury."'
In contrast, many states utilize the positional risk test. Under
the positional risk test, an employee is compensated for any
injury that occurs in the course of employment.49 The Supreme
Court of Virginia repeatedly has rejected the positional risk
test.50 Two recent supreme court decisions reaffirmed Virginia's
commitment to the actual risk test: Lipsey v. Case51 and
Taylor v. Mobil Corp.2
In Lipsey, the plaintiff sued her former employer and a co-
employee for injuries resulting from a dog attack." The em-
45. The ease to which some repetitive trauma conditions are being turned into
diseases only adds to the uncertainty in this area for the practitioner.
46. See Lipsey v. Case, 248 Va. 59, 445 S.E.2d 105 (1994).
47. Id. at 61, 445 S.E.2d at 106.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Peterson v. RTM Mid-America, 209 Ga. App. 691, 434 S.E.2d 521
(1993).
50. See, e.g., County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 185, 376 S.E.2d 73,
76 (1989); City of Richmond v. Braxton, 230 Va. 161, 164-65, 335 S.E.2d 259, 261-62
(1985).
51. 248 Va. 59, 445 S.E.2d 105 (1994).
52. 248 Va. 101, 444 S.E.2d 705 (1994).
53. Lipsey, 248 Va. at 60, 445 S.E.2d at 106.
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ployer argued that the exclusivity provision of the Act barred
the lawsuit. The court found that
[n]othing about the nature or character of her work, i.e.,
the care and training of horses, reasonably could have ex-
posed or subjected her to the danger of being bitten by a
co-worker's pet dog. It simply is not apparent to a rational
mind, in the circumstances of this case, that a causal con-
nection exists -between the conditions of Lipsey's required
work and her injury.'
Because the employer could not establish the requisite nexus
under the actual risk test, the Act did not bar Lipsey's tort
action."
In Taylor v. Mobil Corp.,56 the supreme court held that a
company doctor's negligent care of an employee did not arise
out of employment. Mobil provided its employees with compre-
hensive medical care at an on-site clinic, but did not require
employees to use the clinic." The employee chose to use the
clinic, but the company doctor failed to diagnose his eventually
fatal heart condition.58 The employee's widow sued Mobil and
the company doctor for negligence. The court found that any
cardiologist could have misdiagnosed the employee's condi-
tion.59 Consequently, the employee's exposure to the risk of
negligent treatment was not an actual risk of his employment
and as such his death did not arise out of his employment."0
a. Bending and Crouching Cases
The courts and the Commission continue to wrestle with the
application of Plumb Rite Plumbing Service v. Barbour.6 In
Plumb Rite, the court of appeals held that merely bending over
was insufficient to establish a compensable injury. Instead, the
54. Id. at 61-62, 445 S.E.2d at 107.
55. Id. at 62, 445 S.E.2d at 107.
56. Taylor, 248 Va. at 101, 444 S.E.2d at 705.
57. Id. at 107, 444 S.E.2d at 708.
58. Id. at 105, 444 S.E.2d at 707.
59. Id. at 107, 444 S.E.2d at 708.
60. Id.
61. 8 Va. App. 482, 382 S.E.2d 305 (1989).
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claimant must establish that "the conditions of the workplace or
that some significant work related exertion caused the
injury.""
While merely bending falls outside the scope of the Act, an
"awkward" bend or movement appears to trigger compensabili-
ty. In Grove v. Allied Signal, Inc.,63 a pipe fitter injured his
back reaching for a wrench while repairing pipe in a crouched
position. The record contained evidence that the awkward posi-
tion constituted a hazard unique to the claimant's work. The
court of appeals held that the claimant satisfied the actual risk
test and established proof of a compensable injury by acci-
dent.6
Since the Grove decision, the court of appeals has decided
several awkward position cases. The consensus appears to be
that if the awkward position which resulted in the injury is
uniquely connected to the employment, the injury is compensa-
ble.65 In contrast, if the employee injures himself while merely
bending or squatting, risks to which the general public are
exposed, the injury is not compensable. 6
In John Randolph Medical Center v. Bradley,67 the court of
appeals found a nurse's injury sustained while squatting to
place oxygen tanks on a cart compensable. The court reasoned
that the employee's action was peculiar to her employment
because to place the tanks on the cart, the employee had to
awkwardly squat for four or five minutes in a confined space.6"
62. Id. at 484, 382 S.E.2d at 306.
63. 15 Va. App. 17, 421 S.E.2d 32 (1992).
64. Id. at 22, 421 S.E.2d at 35.
65. See, e.g., John Randolph Medical Ctr. v. Bradley, No. 0324-94-2, 1994 Va.
App. LEXIS 546 (Aug. 16, 1994); Ogden Allied Aviation Serv. v. Shuck, 18 Va. App.
756, 446 S.E.2d 898 (1994).
66. See, e.g., Plumb Rite, 8 Va. App. 482, 382 S.E.2d 305. Of course, if the bend-
ing and squatting occur over a long period of time, the injury may not be compen-
sable because it is gradually occurring. For example, an employee who squats once
for five seconds may be denied compensation in accord with the actual risk test. An
employee who squats once for 45 seconds may have suffered a compensable injury.
An employee who squats nine times for five seconds each over the period of a few
hours may have sustained a gradually occurring injury which is not compensable.
67. No. 0324-94-2, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 546 (Aug. 16, 1994).
68. Id at *1.
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Likewise, in Ogden Allied Aviation Services v. Shuck,69 the
court of appeals held that a mechanic's injury resulting from
looking directly overhead at fuel gauges was compensable, as
looking overhead in that position was not common to the
public.70
In contrast to the above cases, in Cox v. Wade's Supermar-
ket,7' the court of appeals held that an injury sustained when
an employee bent down to retrieve a two pound bottle of oil
was not compensable. The court concluded that the action caus-
ing the injury, merely bending, was common to the public."2
Similarly, in Conley v. Celanese,73 the court of appeals held not




Generally, an injury by accident involving steps is compensa-
ble if there is a defect in the steps or an abnormal condition of
employment caused the accident.76 Such an injury is not com-
pensable merely because stairs on an employer's property ex-
pose the employee to an added risk.7 Several recent cases
demonstrate the application of the actual risk test in stair
cases.
In Southside Virginia Training Center v. Shell,7 the claim-
ant fell down some steps on her way to retrieve a medical file.
The steps had no defects or abnormalities.79 The building the
claimant exited, however, had one more step than the building
69. 18 Va. App. 756, 446 S.E.2d 898 (1994).
70. Id. at 758, 446 S.E.2d at 899-900.
71. No. 0312-94-3, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 556 (Aug. 23, 1994).
72. Id.; see also Blackwel v. April Constr. Co., No. 1842-94-4, 1995 Va. App.
LEXIS 500 (June 6, 1995).
73. No. 0117-94-3, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 457 (Jul. 12, 1994).
74. Id. at *4.
75. "Stair cases" refers to cases involving injuries sustained from accidents
involving stairs.
76. See, e.g., County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 376 S.E.2d 73
(1989); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hosey, 208 Va. 568, 159 S.E.2d 633 (1968).
77. See, e.g., Johnson, 237 Va. at 185-86, 376 S.E.2d at 75-76.
78. 20 Va. App. 199, 455 S.E.2d 761 (1995).
79. Id. at 201, 455 S.E.2d at 762.
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in which she usually worked." Notwithstanding this differ-
ence, the court of appeals reversed the Commission and found
that the claimant did not satisfy the actual risk test.8'
In Marion Correctional Treatment Center v. Henderson,82
Henderson, a correctional officer, slipped down several steps
while performing rounds. At the time of the injury, Henderson
had acknowledged one tower officer and was observing another
tower while he descended the stairs.83 Observing the towers
was a part of Henderson's duties." As he descended the stairs
he slipped down a step and felt a pop in his knee.85 The court
held that the way Henderson performed his job "increased his
risk of falling on this occasion and directly contributed to cause
his fall and injury" 6 and that he would not have been exposed
to this risk outside of this employment. Because Henderson's
claim met the actual risk test, the injury was compensable."
In People's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Austin,89 Austin, a security
guard, slipped on some steps while rushing from her guard
station to the restroom. Austin was rushing because she had to
wait until a relief guard replaced her before she could leave her
position, and the relief guard was delayed." The court stated
that while the "personal comfort" doctrine in Virginia recognizes
that rest breaks occur in the course of employment, the claim-
ant must still establish that an injury sustained on the break
arose out of employment.9' Austin could not explain exactly
why she fell, and thus could not establish that her injury arose
out of her employment.92
80. Id.
81. Id. at 200, 455 S.E.2d at 762.
82. 20 Va. App. 477, 458 S.E.2d 301 (1995).
83. Id. at 479, 458 S.E.2d at 302.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id at 480-81, 458 S.E.2d at 303.
87. Id at 481, 458 S.E.2d at 303.
88. Id.
89. No. 1267-92-4 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 1993).
90. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
91. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
92. Id., slip op. at 5; see also Kraf Constr. Serv. v. Ingram, 17 Va. App. 295, 304,
437 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1993) (Koontz, J., dissenting) (stating that in applying the per-
sonal comfort doctrine, the majority "impermissibly blended together the distinct con-
1995] 1209
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In his dissent, Judge Benton argued that Austin's injury
arose out of her employment, reasoning that "[t]he delay in
relieving Austin coupled with the requirement that she remain
at her post until relieved made her need to hurry to the
restroom a risk of employment . .. Austin... was required to
perform an act in great haste... greatly influenced by her
work environment."9
c. Street Cases
For an injury to be compensable in street cases, the claimant
generally does not have to prove that the public would not have
been exposed to the same risk.94 "[I]f the employment occa-
sions the employee's use of the street, the risks of the street
are the risks of the employment."95
In Marketing Profiles, Inc. v. Hill,96 the claimant alleged
injuries he sustained in a car accident were compensable. The
claimant, a photographer, suffered memory loss and could not
recall events three to four weeks before and after the acci-
dent.9" However, the court determined that at the time of the
accident, the claimant was on his way to an assignment to take
photographs for a church directory." The claimant took similar
trips approximately once a week, and received compensation for
mileage.99 The employer supported the employee's use of his
car to travel to these assignments.0 0 As such, "[t]he hazards
of highway travel ... became necessary incidents of his em-
ployment."
10
cepts of 'in the course of' and 'arising out of' the employment . . .
93. Peoples Drug Stores, slip op. at 8.
94. See, e.g., Immer & Co. v. Brosnahan, 207 Va. 720, 152 S.E.2d 254 (1967).
95. 1 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMP. L. (MB) § 9.40 (release no. 74, May
1995).
96. 17 Va. App. 431, 437 S.E.2d 727 (1993).
97. Id. at 433, 437 S.E.2d at 728.
98. Id. at 432-33, 437 S.E.2d at 728.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id at 435, 437 S.E.2d at 730 (citing Immer & Co. v. Brosnahan, 207 Va. 720,
728, 152 S.E.2d 254, 259 (1967)).
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In Luskins, Inc. v. Neal,"2 the claimant's employer required
her to travel through the Hampton Roads tunnel to pick up
paychecks. In the tunnel, the temperature light in her car came
on and because she was in the tunnel, the claimant did not
stop.' A defective part malfunctioned and hot steam severely
burned the employee. °4 The employee went on this errand at
the request of her employer, the employer paid her for her time
while on the errand, and the employer could have reasonably
expected the employee to be in the tunnel during the er-
rand. ' 5 Consequently, the court held that the employee's inju-
ries arose out of and in the course of her employment and that
the injuries were compensable.' 5
d. Robbery
In Southland Corp. v. Gray,"7 the court found injuries sus-
tained during a robbery compensable. Claimant's employer
prohibited employees from making bank deposits after 3:00 p.m.
unless approved by a supervisor.' The claimant was mugged
and robbed when leaving to make a bank deposit."° The court
found that Southland's policy prohibiting bank deposits after
3:00 p.m. demonstrated that it believed that when employees
make bank deposits, they are exposed to risks to which the
public is not equally exposed."0 Therefore, the court found the
injury compensable reasoning that the claimant met the actual
risk test."'




106. Id. at 527.
107. 18 Va. App. 366, 444 S.E.2d 19 (1994).
108. Id. at 367, 444 S.E.2d at 20.
109. Id. at 367-68, 444 S.E.2d at 20-21. The claimant left to make the deposit at
5:45 p.m., however, the Commission denied the employer's defense that the claim out
violated a safety rule. Id. at 367, 444 S.E.2d at 20.
110. Id. at 368, 444 S.E.2d at 21.
111. Id at 368-69, 444 S.E.2d at 21. The Court also relied on the fact that, ac-
cording to the claimant, the robber expressed no interest in the claimant's purse or
car keys saying "that's not what I want." Id. at 368, 444 S.E.2d at 21.
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The court distinguished Southland from Hill City Trucking,
Inc. v. Christian," in which the court held that injuries suf-
fered by a truck driver during a robbery were not compensable.
In Hill City, nothing about claimant's employment as a truck
driver caused him to have a greater risk of robbery than a
member of the general public."' In contrast, because
Southland required Gray to leave with the day's deposits,
Gray's employment exposed her to a unique risk."
C. In the Course of Employment
The third, and final, element of proof in "injury by accident"
claims is that the injury by accident arose in the course of
employment." To establish this element, a claimant must
prove that the injury occurred during employment, at a place
the employee was reasonably expected to be, while reasonably
fifilling duties of employment or doing something reasonably
incidental thereto."'
1. Going and Coming Rule
Generally, while traveling to or from work, an employee is
not in the course and scope of his employment."7 Exceptions
to the going and coming rule fall into three categories:
(1) where the means of transportation used to go to and
from work is provided by the employer or the employee's
travel time is paid for or included in wages; (2) where the
way used is the sole means of ingress and egress or is con-
structed by the employer; and (3) where the employee is
charged with some duty or task connected to his employ-
ment while on his way to or from work."'
112. 238 Va. 735, 385 S.E.2d 377 (1989).
113. Id. at 739, 385 S.E.2d at 380.
114. Gray, 18 Va. App. at 368, 444 S.E.2d at 21.
115. See, e.g., Lucas v. Lucas, 212 Va. 561, 562-63, 186 S.E.2d 63, 64 (1972).
116. See, e.g., Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 208, 123 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1962).
117. See, e.g., Boyd's Roofing Co. v. Lewis, 1 Va. App. 93, 94, 335 S.E.2d 281, 282
(1985).
118. Sentara Leigh Hosp. v. Nichols, 13 Va. App. 630, 636, 414 S.E.2d 426, 429
(1992) (citing Kendrick v. Nationwide Homes, 4 Va. App. 189, 191, 355 S.E.2d 347,
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The court of appeals recently addressed the second exception
to the going and coming rule in Wetzel's Painting and Wallpa-
pering v. Price." In Price, the claimant reported to a site to
paint the inside of a house." While walking from his vehicle
to the house, the claimant slipped on an icy concrete apron that
had been poured as the entrance to the driveway, breaking his
collar bone." The court of appeals found that the concrete
apron was tantamount to the employer's property and that it
provided an "essential means of ingress and egress from the
public street to the house where the work was to be
performed."' Consequently, the court held that the apron
constituted a hazard of Price's employment and, thus, the inju-
ry sustained in his fall was compensable.'
In interpreting the third exception, the Commission and
courts have developed the "special errand" doctrine.' Under
that doctrine, an employee's journey
may be brought within the course of employment by the
fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the
special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in
the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial
to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself.'
In Harbin v. Jamestown Village," an employee was struck
by a car and killed while crossing the street. The employee was
on his way to meet several co-workers and attend a meeting at
the request of his employer. 7 Witnesses to the accident testi-
fied that the employee appeared distracted as he crossed the
347-48 (1987)).
119. 19 Va. App. 158, 449 S.E.2d 500 (1994).
120. Id. at 159, 449 S.E.2d at 500.
121. The concrete apron was a standard concrete entrance to a driveway that
would ultimately be connected on either side by a sidewalk.
122. Price, 19 Va. App. at 161, 449 S.E.2d at 502.
123. Id. at 162, 449 S.E.2d at 502.
124. See, e.g., Harbin v. Jamestown Village Joint Venture, 16 Va. App. 190, 428
S.E.2d 754 (1993).
125. Id. at 193-94, 428 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting 1 Larson, supra note 95, at (MB) §
16.11 n.8.
126. Id. at 190, 428 S.E.2d at 754 (1993).
127. Id. at 192, 428 S.E.2d at 755.
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street. 8 The employer argued that the death was not com-
pensable because the employee was not in the course and scope
of his employment at the time of the accident and that he en-
gaged in willful misconduct by not paying attention when cross-
ing the street.'29
The court held that "[w]hen an employee is required by an
employer to be away from the employer's place of employment,
the employee is deemed to be in the course of employment
because the employee is engaged in the direct performance of
duties assigned by the employer."3 ' Because the employer re-
quired the employee to attend the meeting, and because neg-
ligence does not bar compensation, the court held the death
compensable.'3 '
2. Personal Comfort Doctrine
Virginia recognizes the "personal comfort" doctrine to bring
breaks and excursions for periodic rest and refreshment within
the course of employment.
3 2
In Kraf Construction Services, Inc. v. Ingram,' the employ-
ee, Ingram, left his employer's premises to get a soft drink from
a store across the street. While crossing the street, the employ-
ee was struck by a car and killed." While a factual dispute
existed as to whether the day's work had ended at the time of
the accident, the evidence established that the employee had to
return to the employer's truck before leaving work.'35 The
court held that where "an employee is required to go to outside
places to work and to return to the employer's office to report,
he is at all such time acting in the course of his employment,
and is entitled to compensation if injured by accident at such
time."3 6 In the alternative, the court held that even if the
128. Id. at 193, 428 S.E.2d at 756.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 196, 428 S.E.2d at 757.
131. Id. at 196, 428 S.E.2d at 757-58.
132. Ablola v. Holland Rd. Auto Ctr. Ltd., 11 Va. App. 181, 183, 397 S.E.2d 541,
543 (1990).
133. 17 Va. App. 295, 437 S.E.2d 424 (1993).
134. Id. at 297-98, 437 S.E.2d at 426.
135. Id. at 298, 437 S.E.2d at 426-27.
136. Id. at 298, 437 S.E.2d at 426 (quoting Taylor v. Robertson Chevrolet Co., 177
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employee had been on a rest break, his death occurred within
the course of employment under the personal comfort doc-
trine.' The court concluded that the fact Ingram left his
employer's premises for his break did not take his actions out
of the course of employment. 8' Consequently, the court held
that Ingram's death was compensable.3 9
III. COVERAGE BY THE ACT
It has been said that the Act covers every employer and
every employee in Virginia.' The issue often becomes wheth-
er a worker qualifies as an employee or an entity as an em-
ployer under the Act.'
A. Employee
The Act defines an employee as any person under a contract
of hire, express or implied, in the employer's usual course of
trade, business, occupation, or profession.' If a worker does
not fall under this definition, the Act does not cover him.'
The supreme court recently addressed the question of wheth-
er an inmate working on a road crew qualifies as an employee
under the Act. In Commonwealth v. Woodward,' the su-
preme court held that because an inmate could not make a
"true" contract of hire he was not an employee under the
Va. 289, 293, 13 S.E.2d 326, 328 (1941)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 299, 437 S.E.2d at 427.
139. Id. at 300, 437 S.E.2d at 427-28. Judge Koontz filed a lengthy dissent arguing
that Ingram's injuries did not arise out of an actual risk of his employment and that
the personal comfort doctrine did not extend compensability to his claim. Id. at 300-
12, 437 S.E.2d at 427-34.
140. LAWRENCE J. PASCAL, VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.1 (2d ed. 1993). There are, however, many exceptions to this general statement,
the most general being that an employer must generally employ three or more em-
ployees to fall within the Act's coverage. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
141. PASCAL, supra note 140.
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
143. Id.
144. 249 Va. 21, 452 S.E.2d 656 (1995).
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Act.' As such, the injuries an inmate sustained while trim-
ming a tree were not compensable. " 6
The supreme court also addressed the issue of what consti-
tutes a contract for hire in Humphries v. Thomas." 7  In
Humphries, a carpet installer voluntarily went with a carpet
store owner on a trip to purchase a trailer for the carpet
store.' The installer worked independently and performed
thirty percent to fifty percent of the owner's installation
work.'49 The installer was driving when the two were involved
in an accident. 5 ' The installer was killed and the owner filed
a lawsuit against the installer's estate for injuries the owner
sustained in the accident. 15'
The court found that the installer went on the trip voluntari-
ly with no expectation of compensation or remuneration.'52
The installer was not an employee at the time of the trip be-
cause an implied or express contract of hire would exist only if
intended and understood by the parties, or if a reasonable per-
son would have expected compensation or remuneration."
Consequently, the Act did not bar the owner's tort claims
against the installer's estate."
B. Statutory Employer
An entity qualifies as a statutory employer under the Act if,
at the time of the injury, the employee was performing work
that was part of the entity's "trade, business, occupation or
profession."'55
145. Id. at 24, 452 S.E.2d at 657.
146. Id. at 26, 452 S.E.2d at 658.
147. 244 Va. 571, 422 S.E.2d 755 (1992).
148. Id. at 573, 422 S.E.2d at 756.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 571, 422 S.E.2d at 755.
152. Id. at 573, 422 S.E.2d at 756.
153. Id. at 574, 422 S.E.2d at 756-57.
154. Id. at 575, 422 S.E.2d at 757.




In Roberts v. City of Alexandria,156 the supreme court ad-
dressed the statutory employer test as it applies to governmen-
tal entities. The Sheriffs department employed the plaintiff as
a nurse at an adult detention center."' The plaintiff fell in a
slippery parking lot owned by the City of Alexandria and subse-
quently sued the City and the Sheriff, for negligent mainte-
nance of the premises.' The City argued that it was the
plaintiffs statutory employer and, thus, the Act barred the
plaintiffs action.'59
The court found that "[t]he statutory-employer test applied to
governmental entities differs from that usually applied to pri-
vate business entities."60 With governmental entities, one
looks not only to what the entity does, but "what they are 'au-
thorized and empowered by legislative mandate to perform'"
that constitutes the trade, business, or occupation.'6'
The city was responsible for the costs of medical services at
the facility where the plaintiff worked, paid the workers' com-
pensation insurance for the jail's employees, and had the power
and authority to operate the jail.'62 Moreover, the court found
the fact that the Code of Virginia requires the city to insure
the Sheriffs employees recognized that the employees "engaged
in the city's trade, business, or occupation."" Accordingly, be-
cause the city was deemed the plaintiffs statutory employer,
the Act barred the plaintiff from pursuing her negligence
lawsuit."
156. 246 Va. 17, 431 S.E.2d 275 (1993).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 19, 431 S.E.2d at 276.
160. Id. (citing Ford v. City of Richmond, 239 Va. 664, 666, 391 S.E.2d 270, 271
(1990)).
161. Id. at 19, 431 S.E.2d at 276 (quoting Ford, 239 Va. at 669, 391 S.E.2d at
273).
162. Id. at 20, 431 S.E.2d at 277.
163. Id at 21, 431 S.E.2d at 277.
164. Id.
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2. Contractors
The supreme court addressed the issue of when businesses
that hire independent contractors become statutory employers
in Johnson v. Jefferson National Bank.'65 In Johnson, the
bank contracted to have some painting work done.'66 An acci-
dent killed one individual and injured another when the scaf-
folding on which they worked fell fifty-six feet due to an electri-
cal line burning the wire ropes holding up the scaffold.'67 The
bank had agreed to have the electricity turned off or the elec-
trical wires insulated, but failed to do so.
168
When sued for negligence, the bank raised the workers' com-
pensation bar. 69 The test applied in determining whether the
painters' work was part of the bank's "trade, business, or occu-
pation" was whether the painting was "'normally carried on by
employees [of the bank] rather than independent contrac-
tors.'" ° The court held that even though the bank's employ-
ees had the capacity to do the painting work, the bank's em-
ployees did not usually perform the work.'7 ' The bank's em-
ployees had never painted at the height and conditions under
which the plaintiffs painted the building.'72 As such, the court
held that the bank was not the painters' statutory employer
since the painting was not a part of the bank's "trade, business,
or occupation."' 7'
The court of appeals addressed the issue of when a general
contractor becomes liable for the injuries of a sub-contractor's
employee in C. Richard Bogese Builder, Inc. v. Robertson.'74
The court held that the general contractor was the statutory
165. 244 Va. 482, 422 S.E.2d 778 (1992).
166. Id. at 483, 422 S.E.2d at 779.
167. Id. at 484, 422 S.E.2d at 779.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 483, 422 S.E.2d at 779.
170. Id. at 485, 422 S.E.2d at 780 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich, 212 Va. 715,
722, 187 S.E.2d 162, 167 (1972)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 484, 422 S.E.2d at 780.
173. Id. at 487, 422 S.E.2d at 781.
174. 17 Va. App. 700, 440 S.E.2d 622 (1994).
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employer since he had contracted with the owner to deliver a
completed home within a certain price range."5 The court
stated that the intent of Virginia Code section 65.2-302 is to
keep contractors from avoiding liability by farming out jobs that
are part of the contractors "trade, business, or occupation."" 6
In another sub-contractor case, Sites Construction v.
Harbeson,'" the court entered an award against the injured
employees' immediate employer, the sub-contractor, instead of
the contractor ultimately responsible for the completion of the
project. Three employees suffered compensable injuries when a
roof collapsed. 8 The Commission entered an award against
the employees' "first statutory employer."7 9 The "first statuto-
ry employer" argued that all statutory employers were jointly
liable for the awards. 8 ' However, the court held that the
claimants had a right to look first to their immediate employer
(the sub-sub-contractor), then the next employer (sub-contrac-
tor), and then the next employer (contractor).18' The court up-
held the Commission's policy to enter an award against the
first statutory employer with adequate coverage on this ascend-
ing ladder.'82
C. Agricultural Exemption
The Act exempts agricultural employers from its provisions,
unless the employer has more than two regular full-time em-
ployees." However, the Act does not establish a criteria for
determining what constitutes regular, full-time employees. Be-
cause agricultural employers often hire seasonal workers, the
definition plays a key role in determining the employers' liabili-
ty under the Act.
In Lynch v. Lee," the claimant applied for compensation
175. Id. at 705, 440 S.E.2d at 625.
176. Id. at 704, 440 S.E.2d at 625.
177. 16 Va. App. 835, 434 S.E.2d 1 (1993).
178. Id. at 837, 434 S.E.2d at 2.
179. -Id.
180. Id. at 838, 434 S.E.2d at 3.
181. Id. at 838-39, 434 S.E.2d at 3.
182. Id. at 839, 434 S.E.2d at 3.
183. VA. CODE _ANN. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (defining "employee").
184. 19 Va. App. 230, 450 S.E.2d 391 (1994) (citing Ferguson v. Bowman, 57 O.I.C.
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for a back injury sustained while he was picking fruit. The
employer had two "full-time" employees, as well as several sea-
sonal workers who worked as much or as little as they want-
ed.'85 The supreme court interpreted the phrase "full-time"
employee as "import[ing] a sense of permanence" or being em-
ployed for "an indefinite amount of time to operate his busi-
ness."'86 Consequently, the court held that the seasonal em-
ployees were not full-time employees and, thus, the agricultural
exemption applied to the employer. 8 '
IV. DEFENSES, BENEFITS, AND SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT
A. Willful Misconduct
The Code of Virginia provides that an employee cannot recov-
er compensation if his willful misconduct caused his inju-
ries." To successfully raise a defense of willful misconduct,
the employer must establish that (1) the safety rule or other
duty was reasonable, (2) the rule was known to the employee,
(3) the rule was for the employee's benefit, and (4) the employ-
ee intentionally undertook the forbidden act.'89
The court of appeals recently addressed the willful miscon-
duct defense in Buzzo v. Woolridge Trucking, Inc.9 ° An em-
ployee was killed when his truck rolled over from turning a
curve too quickly.'9 ' The employer argued that the claimant's
speeding constituted willful misconduct and that his death
should not be compensable.'92 Evidence, however, indicated
the truck's speedometer was broken and had not been fixed
even after several requests for repairs."'
120, 121 (1976)).
185. Id. at 230-31, 450 S.E.2d at 391-92.
186. Id. at 233-34, 450 S.E.2d at 393.
187. Id. at 234-35, 450 S.E.2d at 393-94.
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-306 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
189. Id.
190. 17 Va. App. 327, 437 S.E.2d 205 (1993).
191. Id. at 329, 437 S.E.2d at 207.




The court found that "[piroof of negligence, even gross negli-
gence, alone will not support the defense, for willful misconduct
'imports something more than a mere exercise of the will in
doing the act. It imports a wrongful intention.'""'94 The court
noted, though, that an employer need not prove an employee
intentionally violated the rule, only that the employee inten-
tionally performed an act he or she knew was prohibited.'95
The court held that the claimant did not violate a safety rule,
since he could not have intentionally sped because his speedom-
eter was broken. 95
In another willful misconduct case, Phipps v. Rann Indus-
tries, 7 the claimant filed a claim for benefits after slipping
and injuring himself on a slick ramp. The employer raised the
willful misconduct defense. 8 The day before the claimant's
injury, a woman slipped on the same ramp.'99 In response to
the accident, the claimant prepared a sign to put on the door
leading to the ramp stating "caution: ramp slick" with a picture
of a lady falling down."0 Nevertheless, the employer did not
lock the door after the accident."' Moreover, instructions on
whether employees could use the door were unclear."2
The court applied elements set forth in Buzzo to evaluate the
willful misconduct defense. The court held that since the sign
only cautioned employees to be careful and did not forbid use of
the door, no safety rule barred use of the door.0 3 Also, the
evidence failed to indicate the claimant acted with wrongful
intention.2"
194. Id at 332, 437 S.E.2d at 208 (quoting Uninsured Employer's Fund v. Kemper,
1 Va. App. 162, 164, 335 S.E.2d 851, 852 (1985)).
195. Id. at 332, 437 S.E.2d at 208-09.
196. Id. at 334, 437 S.E.2d at 209-10.
197. 16 Va. App. 394, 429 S.E.2d 886 (1993).
198. Id. at 396, 429 S.E.2d at 887.
199. Id. at 395, 429 S.E.2d at 886.
200. Id
201. Id.
202. Id. at 396-97, 429 S.E.2d at 887.
203. Id at 401, 429 S.E.2d at 889.
204. Id
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In a highly publicized case, Shelton v. Brown Products,211
the full Commission held that an oral admonition in the course
of training did not rise to the level of "an employer-adopted
safety rule."20 ' The claimant severed her hand when she
reached into a machine to reposition a piece of cardboard. °7
No written rule forbade employees from placing hands inside
machinery, but the claimant admitted that she had been
warned orally several times by her trainer not to put her hand
in the machine.0 8
The Commission held that the oral warnings were not a
specific part of rules established by the employer, and that the
employer did not enforce the warnings in the same manner as
formal safety rules.0 9 In addition, the Commission found that
the claimant merely reacted when she placed her hand in the
machine and accidentally turned the blade on.210 As such, her
actions could not be deemed "willful," and the Commission
awarded temporary total benefits to the claimant.21'
B. Benefits for Permanent Loss Under Virginia Code Section
65.2-503
Permanent loss is measured once the claimant has reached
"maximum medical capacity."21 Specific capacity ratings are
essential in determining a partial permanent disability claim,
as indicated in Cafaro Construction Co. v. Strother.1 3
In Cafaro, the claimant reached maximum medical capacity;
however, a specific capacity rating had not been determined.214
205. VWC File No. 157-90-31 (Aug. 27, 1993) (case on file with University of Rich-
mond Law Review).
206. Id. at 6.
207. Id. at 3.
208. Id. at 2.
209. Id. at 6.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 7.
212. Kirk Plastering Co. v. Netherwood, 7 Va. App. 177, 179, 372 S.E.2d 192, 193
(1988); see, e.g., County of Spotsylvania v. Hart, 218 Va. 565, 238 S.E.2d 813 (1977).
213. 15 Va. App. 656, 426 S.E.2d 489 (1993).
214. Id. at 659, 426 S.E.2d at 491.
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The full Commission awarded permanent partial disability ben-
efits because the medical evidence demonstrated that because of
a compensable low back injury the claimant's legs could not be
used in any substantial degree in any gainful employment.215
The court of appeals reversed and dismissed claimant's appli-
cation, holding that a specific capacity rating was necessary
before permanent partial or total loss benefits could be awarded
under the Act.216
Another panel of the court of appeals in Hill v. Woodford B.
Davis General Contractor 7 criticized the holding in Cafaro.
The evidence in Hill established that the claimant had reached
maximum medical improvement and "suffered permanent total
loss" of use of his legs for any substantial gainful employment
as a consequence of his compensable accident.218 The court
criticized the Cafaro court for requiring a specific capacity rat-
ing in cases where the medical evidence supported a total loss
and, thus, an award of permanent total disability benefits.1
Nevertheless, the court concluded it was bound by the doctrine
of stare decisis and followed the holding in Cafaro in denying
permanency benefits."
C. Dependents
The Act entitles an employee's dependents to benefits when
the employee's death results from a compensable accident.2 '
If parents of an employee whose death is compensable under
the Act are in "destitute circumstances" at the time of the
employee's death, they are presumed to have been wholly de-
pendent on the deceased employee.2
215. Id. at 661, 426 S.E.2d at 492.
216. Id. at 662, 426 S.E.2d at 493.
217. 18 Va. App. 652, 447 S.E.2d 237 (1994), reh'g granted en banc, 1994 Va. App.
LEXIS 538 (Jul. 29, 1994).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 654, 447 S.E.2d at 238.
220. Id.
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-512 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
222. Id. § 65.2-515(A)(4).
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The court of appeals recently addressed this issue in Roanoke
Belt, Inc. v. Mroczkowski.2 ' When her son was killed in a
compensable accident, Ms. Mroczkowski applied for benefits as
a destitute parent or in the alternative as a partial depen-
dent.2 ' The Commission denied her claim.2"
At the time of her son's death, Ms. Mroczkowski had an
income of $1,200 a month and had $12,000 in an IRA. Family
expenses were about $1,000 a month. 6 Prior to his death,
the son paid room and board of $75 to $100 a week and acted
as "man of the house."227
Ms. Mroczkowski argued that if not already, she may soon be
destitute.228 The court found, however, that an employer ought
not be required "to await the possible destitution of a parent of
a deceased employee." 22' Accordingly, Ms. Mroczkowski had to
prove that at the time of her son's death a "definite future
event or one reasonably predictable ... would place [her] in
destitute circumstances."230 She was unable to do so. In addi-
tion, because at the time of her son's death Ms. Mroczkowski's
assets exceeded her expenses, the court found she was not
destitute." 1 Finally, she was not a partial dependent of her
son because the money her son paid her was in return for room
and board and not support.3 2
The court of appeals also recently addressed the issue of an
estranged spouse as a dependent under the Act. In Tharp v.
City of Norfolk, 33 the employee and his wife were separated
at the time of his death. The wife filed a claim for benefits as
her husband's dependent.' To establish her dependency, the
wife had to prove that she relied on regular contributions from
223. 20 Va. App. 60, 455 S.E.2d 267 (1995).
224. Id. at 65, 455 S.E.2d at 269.
225. Id. at 67, 455 S.E.2d at 270.
226. Id. at 64-65, 455 S.E.2d at 269.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 71, 455 S.E.2d at 272.
229. Id. at 72, 455 S.E.2d at 273.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 74, 455 S.E.2d at 274.
232. Id. at 74-75, 455 S.E.2d at 273-74.




her husband for necessities "consistent with her station in
life."' 5 Because the two were financially independent-they
had separate bank accounts and there was no proof that he
paid any of her debts-she had not proven she was a dependent
and was not entitled to benefits. 6
D. Selective Employment
1. Unjustified Refusal
An employer can suspend workers' compensation benefits if a
claimant unjustifiably refuses selective employment. 237 The
employee, however, can "cure" this unjustified refusal by accept-
ing the original offer of employment or by finding comparable
employment.
23 8
In Balld'eg v. Crowder Contracting Co., the claimant re-
fused to accept a light-duty position which would require him to
work on Saturdays, a practice prohibited by his religion, Sev-
enth-Day Adventist.' The supreme court noted a long history
of opinions by the Commission recognizing that reasons unrelat-
ed to an employee's work injury can constitute adequate justifi-
cation for refusing selective employment.24 The supreme court
held that religious reasons could constitute an adequate
grounds for refusal.' In fact, the supreme court suggested
that suspending Ballweg's benefits in this instance would be
unconstitutional because such action would unduly burden
Ballweg's right of free exercise of religion.'
235. Id. at 656, 454 S.E.2d at 15.
236. Id at 658, 454 S.E.2d at 16.
237. Timbrook v. O'Sullivan Corp., 17 Va. App. 594, 597, 439 S.E.2d 873, 875
(1994).
238. Virginia Wayside Furniture v. Burnette, 17 Va. App. 74, 76, 435 S.E.2d 156,
157 (1993); see, e.g., Timbroak, 17 Va. App. at 599, 439 S.E.2d at 876-77.
239. 247 Va. 205, 440 S.E.2d 613 (1994).
240. Id. at 207-08, 440 S.E.2d at 614-15.
241. Id. at 209, 440 S.E.2d at 615.
242. Id.
243. Id at 214, 440 S.E.2d at 619.
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On a different issue, the court of appeals held in Virginia
Wayside Furniture, Inc. v. Burnette' that an employee could
cure an unjustified refusal of employment by obtaining a job
paying wages comparable to the job originally offered to the
claimant. The claimant refused selective employment that
would have paid $5.00 to $5.50 an hour." However, when the
claimant obtained a position in another job that paid a compa-
rable wage, the court of appeals held that he had cured his
unjustified refusal and his benefits should be reinstated.2
2. Termination of Benefits
The Commission and courts continue to struggle with the
application of the court of appeals decision in Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Co. v. Murphy 7 which held "where a dis-
abled employee is terminated for cause from selected employ-
ment procured or offered by his employer, any subsequent wage
loss is properly attributable to wrongful act rather than his





In subsequent opinions the court of appeals has sought to
narrow the holding in Murphy. In Timbrook v. O'Sullivan
Corp. ,249 the claimant was terminated from her selective em-
ployment for failing to show up or call in for three consecutive
days. The employer argued that the reasoning in Murphy re-
quired the Commission to terminate the claimant's benefits.250
The court of appeals, however, found that the employee had
refused the selective employment and, thus, concluded that it
would be unreasonable to expect the claimant to call in her
absences for work she had refused. 5'
244. 17 Va. App. 74, 435 S.E.2d 156 (1993).
245. Id. at 76, 435 S.E.2d at 158.
246. Id. at 79-80, 435 S.E.2d at 160.
247. 12 Va. App. 633, 406 S.E.2d 190, affd en banc, 13 Va. App. 304, 411 S.E.2d
444 (1991).
248. Id. at 639-40, 406 S.E.2d at 193.
249. 17 Va. App. 594, 439 S.E.2d 873 (1994).
250. Id. at 594, 439 S.E.2d at 874.
251. Id. at 598, 439 S.E.2d at 876.
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The claimant refused to report for selective employment be-
cause she felt she had not sufficiently recovered to perform the
work.2 2 Even though her belief was without merit, the court
found that she was discharged for a reason related to her inju-
ry.2  The court held that the employee had unjustifiably re-
fused employment; thus, the employee's benefits were suspend-
ed, not terminated, and she cured her refusal by accepting
comparable employment.'
In Eppling v. Schultz Dining Programs,255 the court of
appeals distinguished Murphy when an employee was terminat-
ed from her selective employment because of excessive
absenteeism, but was able to establish that non-work-related
health problems caused the absences. The court found that
wrongful conduct did not cause her termination. 6 Instead,
the court compared her situation to that of the employee that is
unable to return to work because of other reasons beyond her
control. Consequently, the court of appeals held that the
claimant's benefits should have been suspended, not terminat-
ed.3
In Tumlin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,259 the court of
appeals confirmed that the termination of benefits rule in Mur-
phy did not apply to medical benefits and vocational benefits
awarded under Virginia Code section 65.2-603. The court also
held that the rule did not terminate permanent loss benefits
awarded under Virginia Code section 65.2-503.26 0 The ratio-
nale for the holding was that permanent loss benefits do not
compensate a claimant for a wage loss, but instead compensate
the claimant for permanent loss of a body part and the related
252. Id. at 596, 439 S.E.2d at 874.
253. Id.
254. Id at 599, 439 S.E.2d 876-77.
255. 18 Va. App. 125, 442 S.E.2d 219 (1994).
256. Id. at 130, 442 S.E.2d at 222.
257. Id. at 129, 442 S.E.2d at 222.
258. Id. at 129-30, 442 S.E.2d at 222.
259. 18 Va. App. 375, 444 S.E.2d 22 (1994).
260. Id. at 381, 444 S.E.2d at 25 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-503 (Repl. Vol.
1995)).
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presumed economic loss.261 As such, the termination for cause
did not affect the benefits.262
Just when it appeared that the rule announced in Murphy
would fade away, the court of appeals recently sustained a
termination of benefits in Richfood, Inc. v. Williams.2 In
Richfood, the employer terminated the employee for cause when
he tested positive for drugs in violation of a conditional rein-
statement agreement between the employer and employee.2"
Although the claimant later obtained employment, the court
held that since he was terminated for cause, he was responsible
for the wage loss and "was not entitled to temporary partial
disability benefits after discharge."265
V. PROCEDURE
Since June of 1992, there have been many significant devel-
opments regarding procedural issues before the Commission.
The most significant change involved revision of the
Commission's rules. 266 Now discovery before the Commission
almost mirrors discovery in Virginia civil actions. No longer
must a party obtain the permission of the Commission before
propounding interrogatories or deposing doctors.6 7
Other significant new rules include, for example, Rule 1.3
which allows the Commission to dismiss a claim for the failure
to file supporting medical evidence.2' Further, Rules 2.2(B)3
& 4 require the parties to specifically designate the deposition
and medical evidence upon which the party will rely at the
261. Id. at 380-81, 444 S.E.2d at 25.
262. Id.
263. 20 Va. App. 404, 457 S.E.2d 417 (1995).
264. Id. at 404, 457 S.E.2d at 417.
265. Id. The court's emphasis on "wrongful conduct" suggests that it may be mov-
ing toward a standard similar to that utilized in cases in which unemployment com-
pensation is denied due to an employee's willful violation of an employer's rules.
While the court of appeals has not explicitly made this analogy, such a comparison
would not be surprising, insofar as the court of appeals has jurisdiction over both
workers' compensation and unemployment compensation cases.
266. VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RULES OF THE VIRGINIA
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION (1994).
267. Id. Rule 1.7(G), (H).
268. Id. Rule 1.3.
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hearing.269 The rules also added some protection for a claim-
ant under an award by including Rule 5 which provides that:
"A claimant under an award shall not be liable for the cost of
medical services payable under the Act."27
A. Admissibility of Medical Histories
Several court decisions have also had a procedural impact.
The court of appeals has held that the Commission can use
history given to a medical provider to determine how an acci-
dent occurred. In McMurphy Coal Co. v. Miller,"1 the court
held that the claimant failed to establish a compensable injury
by accident since he had not provided his doctors with accurate
histories. The court found that the history was an "admission
by a party, admissible when offered by an adverse party as an
exception to the hearsay rule."272
B. Filing of Medical Records Under Rule 17
In North v. Landmark Communications,... the court of ap-
peals held that a Rule 17 violation constitutes reversible error.
The employer failed to immediately file a relevant medical
report that showed the claimant was disabled and could not
return to work.2" Since the records were relevant to the case
and were not available due to the failure of the employer to
timely fie the reports, the Rule 17 violation constituted revers-
ible error and the case could be re-opened.7
269. Id. Rule 2.2(B)3-4.
270. Id. Rule 5.
271. 20 Va. App. 57, 455 S.E.2d 265 (1995).
272. Id. at 59, 455 S.E.2d at 266; see also Pence Nissan Oldsmobile v. Oliver, 20
Va. App. 314, 456 S.E.2d 541 (1995). The court of appeals, however, clearly states
that a claimant cannot rise above his or her own testimony at the hearing.
McMurphy Coal, 20 Va. App. at 59, 455 S.E.2d at 266.
273. 17 Va. App. 639, 440 S.E.2d 156 (1994).
274. Id. at 640, 440 S.E.2d at 156.
275. Id at 643, 440 S.E.2d at 158.
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C. Statute of Limitations
In Mayberry v. Alcoa Building Products,276 the court of ap-
peals held that the entry of a medical only award does not toll
the two year statute of limitations for compensation for work
incapacity. Since no award was entered, the claimant could not
file for a change in condition because a change in condition re-
views an award."' "It is impossible to have a change in condi-
tion without a prior award."278
In McCarthy Electric Co. v. Foster,"9 the court of appeals
held that parties are not entitled to notice of judgment from the
Commission. Hence, the time to file for appeal begins from the
date of the award regardless of whether the parties are noti-
fied.28 In addition, the employer admitted having received a
letter from the employee concerning the award, which was
sufficient notice.2"'
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. New Acts in 1995
The 1995 Session of the General Assembly passed five bills
concerning workers' compensation that Governor Allen signed
into law. First, the definition of injury was amended as it con-
cerns recreational activities. Effective July 1, 1995, by explicit
statutory language, the Act will not cover an employee's injury
incurred during voluntary participation in an employer spon-
sored off-duty recreational activity."2
In addition, the Code of Virginia was revised so that an em-
ployee cannot cure his unjustified refusal of selective employ-
276. 18 Va. App. 18, 441 S.E.2d 349 (1994).
277. Id. at 20, 441 S.E.2d at 350.
278. Id. at 21, 441 S.E.2d at 350-51 (citing Allen v. Mottley Constr. Co., 160 Va.
875, 886, 170 S.E. 412, 416 (1933)).
279. 17 Va. App. 344, 437 S.E.2d 246 (1993).
280. Id. at 347-48, 437 S.E.2d at 248-49.
281. Id.
282. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (defining "injury").
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ment if his unjustified refusal lasts longer than six months.8
The six month period runs from the last day compensation was
paid before payments were stopped due to the unjustified refus-
al. 4 Furthermore, once the employee unjustifiably refuses
light-duty employment, he loses his temporary partial and voca-
tional rehabilitation benefits. 2' Generally, an employee is en-
titled only to permanent benefits and medical benefits if he un-
justifiably refuses suitable employment. If an employee cures
his refusal by accepting employment, the employer is only liable
for 66 2/3 percent of the difference between the employee's
wages before the injury and the wages of the job originally
offered to the employee. 6
The 1995 Session of the General Assembly also passed legis-
lation concerning the repayment of health care fees. While the
Commission has had exclusive jurisdiction over all fee disputes,
it now also has express authority to order health care providers
to repay excessive fees." 7
Additional legislation provided that the three year statute of
limitations on Black Lung claims begins to run once a diagnosis
of the disease is communicated to the administrator of the
deceased's estate.
Finally, an employer's right to subrogate for compensation
payments from third-party recoveries under the employer's
uninsured or underinsured motorists policy has been
codified.8 9
B. New Acts in 1994
Several significant changes to the workers' compensation
statute also were made in 1994. First, the Code of Virginia was
amended to include a rebuttable presumption of intoxication in
283. Id § 65.2-510(c).
284. Id.
285. Id. § 65.2-510(A).
286. Id. § 65.2-510(B).
287. Id- § 65.2-714(A).
288. Id. § 65.2-406(A)(1).
289. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Cum. Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-309.1
(Repl. Vol. 1995).
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workers' compensation cases.29 A rebuttable presumption of
intoxication or use of a nonprescribed controlled substance ex-
ists if, at the time of his injury or death, the employee meets or
exceeds the standard under section 18.2-266 of the Code of
Virginia.. or yields a positive test result for the use of a non-
prescribed controlled substance from a laboratory certified by
the National Institute on Drug Abuse.292
The 1994 Session also increased the penalty for making
fraudulent statements to obtain compensation benefits. The
penalty for making false, fictitious or fraudulent statements to
obtain workers' compensation benefits has been increased from
a Class 1 Misdemeanor 293 to a Class 6 Felony.294
Additionally, the 1994 Session corrected the long-standing
problem of the payment of benefits during the time period to
request review of an award. Under the new law, the penalty for
late payment will not be imposed until two weeks after the
time to request review (twenty days) or note appeal to the court
of appeals (thirty days.)295 Further, the General Assembly
modified the means for establishing set-offs for third-party
290. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-306(B) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
291. The code states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle,
engine or train (i) while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of
0.08 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more per
210 liters of breath as indicated by a chemical test administered as pro-
vided in this article, (ii) while such person is under the influence of
alcohol, (iii) while such person is under the influence of any narcotic
drug or any other self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever
nature, or any combination of such drugs, to a degree which impairs his
ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train safely, or
(iv) while such person is under the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug or drugs to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate
any motor vehicle, engine or train safely.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
292. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-306(B) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
293. A Class 1 misdemeanor is punishable by not more than one year in prison
and/or a fine not to exceed $2,500. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11(a) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
294. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-312(B) (Repl. Vol. 1995). A Class 6 Felony is punish-
able by one to five years in prison, or at the discretion of a jury (or by the court if
there is no jury,) no more than one year in prison and/or a fine not to exceed $2,500.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(f) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
295. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-524 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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settlements. Under this section, an employer must pay a pro-
portionate share of attorney's fees."'
Further, legislation affecting health care providers was enact-
ed. Until an award is made, health care providers cannot pur-
sue collection (call or write, threatening further action) for ser-
vices rendered in connection with an alleged workers' compen-
sation claim.29 ' Neither can health care providers balance bill
employees for the difference between the amount charged for
services and the amount the insurance company paid.298 More-
over, to prevent multiple diagnostic tests, in certain circum-
stances, a health care provider's records must be transferred to
succeeding physicians, and no medical test can be repeated
within sixty days unless its medical necessity is certified by a
qualified physician.299
Finally, the Code of Virginia was amended as it concerns the
licensing of vocational rehabilitation providers. Vocational reha-
bilitation services provided under the Act must now be per-
formed by a certified provider or person certified by the Boards
of Medicine, Nursing, Optometry, Professional Counselors, Psy-
chology, or Social Work."'0
C. New Acts in 1993
The most significant legislation passed by the 1993 Session of
the General Assembly and signed into law involved independent
medical exams. An employer cannot make an employee submit
to more than one examination per medical specialty without
prior approval by the Commission based on a showing of good
cause.
30 '
296. Id. § 65.2-313.
297. Id. § 65.2-601.1(A).
298. Id. § 65.2-714(D).
299. Id. § 65.2-604(B).
300. Id. § 65.2-603(A)(3).
301. Id. § 65.2-607(A).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In the last three years, there have been significant develop-
ments in Virginia workers' compensation law. We have attempt-
ed to provide the practitioner with a helpful summary of the
most significant and relevant developments during this period.
